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ABSTRACT: The euro area crisis cannot be understood without combining insights from a 
variety of disciplines -- economics and political science first and foremost. This introduction 
aims at explaining how the essays in this collection map onto a number of important debates 
in political science. We sketch four well-known areas for the political science community: the 
framework for multilevel governance, the role of ideas in policymaking, the interaction 
between power politics and distributive bargaining, and the challenge of popular legitimation. 
These critical themes in the current crisis are important areas of overlap in economic and 
political analysis. Hence, the aim of this introduction is to show how these themes emerge in 
the essays that follow. 
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Introduction 
The euro area crisis cannot be understood without combining insights from a variety of 
disciplines – economics and political science first and foremost. Nevertheless, most 
conversations about European integration, and monetary integration in particular, take place 
within disciplinary boundaries. This is true even when the participants hope to speak to a 
wider audience in the public and private sectors. A few academic outlets, like the Journal of 
European Integration, do their best to create a forum for scholars from different disciplines to 
interact. Nevertheless, more often than not the contributors wind up having parallel 
conversations – citing the work of their disciplinary colleagues, using the same jargon, and 
ignoring the rest. 
This lack of engagement across disciplines is a problem insofar as the different voices 
in the debate about the origins of and remedies for the European crisis have so much to offer 
one another. This is perhaps easiest to see when political scientists rely on economic analysis 
as in the recent debate about austerity (Blyth 2012). There are important examples that go in 
the other direction with economists drawing upon political science, as in the recent debates 
about democracy and development (Acemoglu and Robinson 2005) or income inequality 
(Piketty 2014). Nevertheless, it is a harsh reality that in a world indexed by Google and 
narrated by Twitter, the barriers to entry in any disciplinary conversation are large. There is 
simply too much material out there that is too accessible. Just keeping abreast with the pace 
of analysis and commentary within a given discipline is enough of a challenge to occupy the 
time of any academic, analyst or researcher. As a consequence, much value added is lost. 
The purpose of this special issue is help redress the balance. In doing so, we hope to 
honour the memory of Max Watson, who was an academic, analyst and policymaker who 
showed the true value of interdisciplinary research and cross-disciplinary conversation. 
Organizing a series of seminars and a workshop on these very issues were among his last 
scholarly endeavours. We are privileged to be able to complete a project started with him and 
that he so generously supported. 
Our contribution with this collection is two-fold. First, we make available the insights 
of some of the most accomplished economists and policymakers working on the crisis in the 
euro area to a wider research community from cognate disciplines. With few exceptions that 
will be easy to spot from the notes on contributors, these are not ‘interdisciplinary’ scholars. 
They work within the economics discipline, where they have achieved the highest level of 
recognition. We have asked these contributors to write in accessible language and to focus on 
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questions of broad significance. They have responded with a wealth of insight about 
opportunities missed, flaws uncovered, data misinterpreted, experience ignored, and politics 
trumping economics. Each of these arguments sheds light on a different aspect of the 
European dilemma and each reveals an agenda for positive action. Some of this action is 
conceptual and shows how we can better understand the dynamics at work both in the current 
crisis and looking to the future; some is more practical and suggests how we can reshape 
European institutions to make them more resilient – and integration more sustainable – 
looking to the future. The abstracts to the different essays provide a quick survey of the 
material they contain, and so, we do not repeat that information here. 
The success of that contribution should be measured in terms of the breadth of appeal 
– both for the individual papers and for the collection as a whole. Hence, the goal of these 
essays is not to push forward scientific knowledge in the ‘normal’ manner described by 
Thomas Kuhn (1970). Strict disciplinary journals would be more appropriate for such 
arguments. But then, our ambition to foster cross-disciplinary exchange would be thwarted. 
Hence, we encouraged our contributors to challenge fundamental assumptions and to look 
across disciplinary boundaries. In doing so, we asked them to work outside their comfort 
zones and to develop arguments that are more familiar to those working in other disciplines. 
This should create multiple avenues for engagement.  
This explains our second contribution, which is to show how the essays in this 
collection map onto a number of important debates in political science. We use the 
introduction and conclusion to achieve that objective. This allows us to highlight areas we 
believe are of particular concern. It also makes it easy for us to show how this kind of cross-
disciplinary engagement can take place. We offer a gateway not a finished product. There are 
other themes from political science that recur in these essays. We leave these for the reader to 
discover. Moreover, the value added to draw from this type of collection will always be a 
work in progress. If we can introduce these arguments to a new audience and show how they 
can be folded into existing debates with which that audience is likely to be familiar, we can 
begin the cross-disciplinary conversation. 
The introduction sets the stage by sketching four areas for attention that are well 
known within the political science community: the framework for multilevel governance, the 
role of ideas in policymaking, the interaction between power politics and distributive 
bargaining, and the challenge of popular legitimation. These are critical themes in the current 
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crisis and important areas of overlap in economic and political analysis. Hence, the aim of the 
introduction is to show how these themes emerge in the essays that follow.  
The goal of the conclusion is to suggest how both economists and political scientists 
can use shared themes to foster a coherent and productive cross-disciplinary conversation. 
That conversation should help us move towards a two-fold objective: it should improve the 
quality of the answers we provide to important questions in the scholarly literature and should 
also help to shape recommendations for strengthening public policy. Clearly, the European 
Union needs to make progress on both dimensions. There is a wealth of insight and analysis 
out there to be exploited offering a variety of solutions to the wide array of pressing 
problems. At the moment, though, the interaction between economics and politics is working 
against effective public policymaking. The solutions that are acceptable are not effective, and 
many of the measures that could improve the situation are unpopular (if not simply 
unacceptable). It is times like these that we need to start thinking outside of disciplinary 
boxes. 
 
Multilevel Governance 
At its core, the euro area crisis is a crisis in the framework for multilevel governance. For 
political scientists, this is territory made familiar both through the study of federal systems 
and through analysis of the European Union itself. Liesbeth Hooghe and Gary Marks (2001) 
have brought together the various strands of argument in the multilevel governance literature 
in a synthetic framework and Fritz Scharpf (1999; 2001) has provided invaluable insights on 
the unique challenges that multilevel governance arrangements face in terms of decision-
making and legitimation. These insights are fundamental to understanding the crisis of the 
euro area. 
Consider, for example the theory of optimum currency areas (OCA). In abstract 
terms, the question is how large or small of an economy domain should be encompassed by a 
single currency. In more practical terms, the question is whether the currency domain and the 
political domain should be the same. The OCA literature exists because economists 
questioned the necessity of subjugating economic institutions to a political logic – one 
sovereign and so one currency. Yet if you break that link, then it is unclear how many 
governance institutions need to coordinate at the same level of aggregation as the currency 
and how many can be allowed to operate at levels that are either larger or smaller. This is an 
	5	
	
age-old problem and, as Vitor Gaspar shows, it lies at the heart of American experience with 
federal state building. Gaspar focuses on the financial system and the crucial role played by 
Alexander Hamilton in structuring both federal budgets and private finances. The story he 
tells is progressive insofar as the U.S. federal state continues to amass authority. It is a non-
linear story; Hamilton’s financial institutions were largely dismantled by Andrew Jackson. 
Nevertheless, Hamilton anticipated much of what is required in a modern multilevel financial 
economy like the one you find in the United States today. 
The process of European integration is only very loosely analogous to the U.S. 
experience. Nevertheless, there are certain insights about multilevel governance in the areas 
of money and finance that resonate in both places. You can see this in the essay by Francesco 
Giavazzi and Charles Wyplosz. The story they tell is about design features that should have 
been included in European efforts and yet were omitted either because they were unpopular 
or because they were simply ignored. Fiscal union falls in the unpopular category; financial 
union should be filed under neglect. Implicitly, this shows the importance of learning from 
the experience of other cases. The United States tried to manage a currency without a 
financial union and nearly failed. That is why Hamilton’s original insights are so important. 
Hamilton had a more lasting impact on federal finances. Yet if pooling finances is necessary 
for successful monetary integration, it is an open question why the architects of the single 
currency went ahead with their project without securing political support for fiscal 
centralization first. 
The easy answer is to assume that monetary policy could operate at the European 
level while fiscal policy could operate at the national level. This assumption works under 
certain conditions. But it does not work when national economies are allowed to accumulate 
essentially unlimited public or private sector liabilities. This is the point made in the paper by 
Russel Kincaid and Max Watson. What it reveals are the externalities of policy action (or 
inaction) at the mid-range of a multilevel governance structure. Their point is that these 
externalities accumulate to such an extent that they can threaten the viability of the multilevel 
governance framework as a whole. Moreover, there are strong incentives at the Member State 
level to allow these imbalances to accumulate into a source of systemic stability. As Scharpf 
(and many others in the political science community) anticipated, there are gaps in the 
decision-making framework that no level of government and no specific actor have the 
authority to fill. The consequences can be seen in the essay by Lorenzo Bini Smaghi. He 
shows how attempts to impose conditionality on governments in distress have failed to 
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achieve a desired reaction. Worse, they have engendered widespread discontent – both among 
those countries that have been subjected to conditionality and among those countries that 
have provided resources for European bailouts against what they now perceive as ‘empty’ 
promises of ‘meaningful’ reform. This is a challenge that Iain Begg and his colleagues 
recognize as well. In fact, an alternative to an improbable full-fledged fiscal integration 
would be to improve both the current model of conditionality and make it more sustainable 
(Bini Smaghi) and complementing it with an integrated economic policy framework (Begg et 
al., Kincaid and Watson and Sapir and Wolff, 2015). 
The problem of imbalances focuses on the negative interaction between a large 
currency union and smaller fiscal authorities. A further concern is the interaction between 
policymakers in the monetary and fiscal domains that does not take place because they are 
not working at the same level of aggregation. Here, the issue is not perverse incentives that 
give rise to excessive indebtedness, it is the lack of coordination necessary for effective 
macroeconomic adjustment. This theme would be anachronistic in the paper by Gaspar; 
macroeconomic demand stabilization was not a consideration for the founding fathers of the 
American Republic. It was not anachronistic for the founders of the euro area. Indeed, the 
importance of coordinating makes an appearance in Giavazzi and Wyplosz and features 
prominently in the essays by Paul De Grauwe and Yuemei Ji and by David Vines. Implicitly, 
the contributors appeal to a set of economic models where macroeconomic policy 
coordination is useful in stabilizing the evolution of inflation and unemployment. Such 
models assume a level of aggregation – both for policymaking and for data collection. Hence 
they also assume some connection between the domains for political control and for relevant 
economic activity. This creates an important tension in the theory of optimum currency areas 
– and hence also a tension in the architecture of the euro. A currency should encompass 
efficient markets (Mundell 1961) but it should also encompass effective macroeconomic 
demand stabilization (McKinnon 1963), and where the scale for effective macroeconomic 
demand stabilization is larger than the domain of market efficiency, then appropriately 
designed fiscal institutions can make up the difference through automatic flows in taxes and 
transfers across regions within the currency area (Kenen 1969). In other words, multilevel 
governance is both the problem and the solution. 
 
The Role of Ideas 
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Of course, it is also possible that the shared assumption about the importance of coordinating 
macroeconomic policy instruments is flawed because aggregate demand stabilization is not a 
valid policy objective. Economists do not all accept models derived from the neoclassical 
synthesis. Indeed, those models are hotly contested in Europe. This observation is 
fundamental in the political science literature. It lies at the heart of virtually every major 
contribution to the role of ideas in comparative political economy from Peter Hall’s (1989) 
edited volume on Keynesianism across nations to Kathleen McNamara’s (1998) study of 
monetary integration and Mark Blyth’s (2002) work on the monetarist revolution. Economists 
are more comfortable trying to assert their own ideas in the policy process than trying to 
understand how ideas influence policy more generally. Nevertheless, they are well aware that 
such influence exists and that contestation has an impact on policy outcomes. This is clearly 
shown in the collection of papers on joining Europe’s monetary club, which we published in 
the phase of convergence towards EMU (Jones et al. 1998). 
Vines’ essay is perhaps the strongest expression of concern about the role of ideas in 
European policymaking. He focuses his attention on the German economic establishment, but 
his real concern is not ‘Germany’ but what he brands as poor thinking. Hence, his essay is 
both an attempt to diagnose the problem at the heart of the European crisis and to explain 
how we might think about it more fruitfully. Erik Jones has a similar agenda in his essay. 
Ironically, the two disagree on both the most appropriate set of ideas for addressing the crisis 
and the appropriate strategy for choosing between them. There is a certain reassurance that 
emerges from the debate between them. No view has a monopoly on the truth. Hence, the 
contestation over ideas is not without reason. 
That is not the same as saying that all ideas deserve equal merit. Some ideas work 
better than others – in helping policymakers to influence the world around them, but also in 
helping politicians to mobilize political support. This is one of the fundamental insights in the 
political science literature and it is on full display here as well. It connects the stories about 
institutional design features adopted and ignored by the architects of the single currency in 
the Giavazzi and Wyplosz essay to the conditionality and reform debates in the Bini Smaghi 
and Begg et al. papers and to the macroeconomic policies analysed by De Grauwe and Ji. 
Ideas can take us further as well. As Blyth (2002) argues, ideas are a focal point for 
coordination. What De Grauwe and Ji show is how this coordination expresses in European 
financial markets. What they reveal is the extent to which actual financial market 
performance is inconsistent with what we would expect from ideational constructs like the 
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efficient markets hypothesis. Instead of responding smoothly and consistently to assessments 
of fiscal solvency and sovereign creditworthiness, markets tend to ignore fiscal variables until 
suddenly they find them to be of interest. Ideas do not fit the rationality of perfect 
information, in that sense. They are heuristic or signalling devices used by market 
participants. (As an aside, there is a growing literature on voters and elections that comes to 
similar conclusions in a more explicitly political context.) Moreover, market participants are 
not the only economic agents who are fickle in their treatment of fiscal ideas. Zsofia Barta 
and Waltraud Schelkle show similar inconsistencies in the behaviour of credit ratings 
agencies and supranational institutions. These organizations do not have a monolithic sense 
of what is good and what is bad in the fiscal domain; rather, they operate with contested 
concepts and changing conventions. 
Differences in ideas within a multilevel governance framework make for an added 
complication. This is another insight that Barta and Schelkle reveal. Once again, moreover, 
we are confronted with the disjuncture between the policy domain and the scope of relevant 
economic activity. This time, however, the supranational institutions are smaller than the 
economic actors (credit ratings agencies) that are the focus for attention. Hence, at least part 
of the challenge is to bring the credit ratings agencies into the policy domain. This challenge 
is not straightforward. Having validated the credit ratings agencies as sources of policy 
relevant data by writing ratings requirements into European legislation, European 
policymakers may have made matters worse rather than better. 
Striking an appropriate balance is not easy. This is true partly because of the influence 
of unintended consequences and partly due to the lack of adequate measurement. Francesco 
Mongelli and his colleagues tackle the measurement problem by creating an indicator for 
capturing the evolution of the European Union as a framework for multilevel governance. 
The indicator they develop tracks the four unions that are central to the ‘Five Presidents 
Report’ (2015) to improve the architecture of the European Union. We return to this report in 
the conclusion. For now, what Mongelli et al. reveal is how much judgement is involved in 
assessing progress in institution building. Ideas factor into every aspect of the measurement 
process and so weave contention into the very fabric of our understanding of European 
integration. 
 
Distributive Bargaining and Power Politics 
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Contention over the nature of European integration cannot be resolved through reference to 
objective principles. The European federalists recognized that early on. Worse, there are no 
iron clad or ineluctable causal mechanisms underpinning the process of institution building. 
Early neo-functionalists like Ernst Haas (1968) were disillusioned. Their historical 
institutionalist successors have been no more successful. This is not to say that neo-
functionalist spillover or historical path dependence have no relevance. On the contrary, each 
of the essays in this collection shows how the crisis ‘spills’ across discrete policy areas, they 
illustrate the need for more coordinated intervention, and they highlight the challenge of 
working with and through those institutions that actually exist (as opposed to imagining some 
alternative universe). Nevertheless, even the most elegant framework for understanding 
European integration – or economics – has to allow space for distributive bargaining and 
power politics. 
In many of the essays collected here, these forces show up as a kind of political 
hidden hand. They explain why the architects of the single currency did not pursue fiscal 
federalism and how they came to ignore the advantages of pooling financial market 
supervision. On a deeper level, they explain how macroeconomic imbalances arose, why they 
were allowed to grow to unsustainable dimensions and why national politicians have been so 
reluctant to undertake the reforms necessary to prevent their recurrence. Distributive 
bargaining and power politics explain the very negative dynamics at work in the application 
of ‘conditionality’, they explain the suspicion that often greets the promulgation of German 
ideas about the virtues of fiscal austerity and the ineffectiveness of macroeconomic demand 
stabilization, and they explain the difficulty of forging some kind of effective European 
discretion in responding to crisis imperatives. 
The question is whether any pattern lies buried in all this negativity. If that pattern is 
‘might makes right’, then the goal should be to persuade the most powerful or influential 
policy actors. If the pattern is ‘right makes might’, then the goal should be to speak truth to 
power. It is interesting in this sense to look at the tone of the different essays to see where 
they fall in that spectrum and what this implies about underlying assumptions. Here again, the 
contrast between Jones and Vines is of interest. There are, however, many more than just two 
points on the spectrum. Hence, it is useful to look at each of the essays to assess both the 
audience and the objective of the authors. It is also useful to judge which is likely to have any 
measure of success in influencing either the scholarly community or the policy process. 
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Popular Legitimation 
By considering these contributions as part of a larger conversation, it becomes easier to fold 
them into the mechanism of European integration itself. That is an important step in the 
process of engagement. The point here is not that these essays will revolutionize how we 
understand Europe or how Europe is organized. Rather it is that each in its own way tackles a 
problem of multilevel governance, offers an idea about how that problem can be resolved and 
addresses that idea to a particular audience that hopefully will have some influence over the 
situation. Whether that influence is whispered directly into the ear of the most powerful 
person in the room or filters its way up through the cacophony of contemporary academic 
discourse is irrelevant. In the long run, ‘Keynes’ long-defunct economists’ have as much 
influence as Keynes himself. Indeed, Keynes worries (not unreasonably) that he is 
outmatched. 
For such a broad assessment to work, however, it must take questions of popular 
legitimation into account. These questions are front and centre in the chapter by Begg and his 
colleagues. That explains why they are so focused on the sustainability of integration as a 
multi-dimensional problem. If we are to take the long term into account, it is not enough 
simply to address the current crisis; it is not even enough to avoid the dilemma where the 
solutions of today become the problems of tomorrow. Here, it is worth recalling that 
Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa et al. (1987) foresaw irrevocably fixed exchange rates as the first-
best response to the challenge of currency market volatility even as politicians in France and 
Germany believed that monetary union would cement the reconciliation of their two countries 
(Dyson and Featherstone 1999). 
Hence, the key to long-term sustainability requires doing more than just addressing 
the current crisis; it depends upon policymakers developing institutions and practices that will 
make it easier to address other future crises as well. The solution to the current problems of 
the euro area must help us deal with population ageing and climate change. This may seem 
far-fetched; once we take into account the impact of current reforms on public expenditures 
and market structures, however, it is easy to see how they are all connected. These 
connections exist in the eye of the public as well. Policymakers are not alone in having ideas 
about how the world works, and they are not unique in realizing the multilevel structure of 
governance. The people are active participants in politics as well as in the markets. Moreover, 
their actions play a critical role in validating or vitiating the assumptions that underpin 
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European institutions. When De Grauwe and Ji focus their analysis on the behaviour of 
markets, this is what they mean. 
The challenge for analysis is to understand how people are organized and what are the 
relevant levels of aggregation. That notion of relevance hinges on the principle of legitimacy. 
Where legitimacy is greatest, policymakers have the most effective control over collective 
action. This is what Begg and his colleagues reveal. Drawing upon the work of Kalypso 
Nicolaïdis (2010; 2013), they show how units of political legitimation – demoi – operate as 
the political equivalent of optimum currency areas. These units are not equal in scale or scope 
to the currency itself. That is the fundamental challenge. Hence, it is necessary for these 
different units to engage in power politics and distributive bargaining in order to influence 
how their common currency is governed. Along the way, they fight over different ideas about 
how the economy works and what institutions offer the most control over economic 
performance. And they reserve the right to act as sovereign even within a multilevel 
governance framework. This political analysis is not so different from the economic analysis 
in other chapters. Nevertheless, it operates at the other end of the prism with economic 
rationality on one end and political legitimation on the other. In fact, as put by Begg et al. and 
Mongelli et al., economic integration would have to be pursued along the lines of creating 
stronger incentives for structural reforms in low-productivity countries, thereby improving 
the overall stability of EMU to macroeconomic shocks by making the Eurozone better meet 
the economic requirements for a currency union.  
Between these two points is a large and complicated set of dynamics. Currently, those 
dynamics are in crisis. Any attempt to resolve that crisis must take account of both the 
economic and political forces at work. The purpose of this collection is to shed light on the 
economic side of the problem. Doing so, however, only reveals the political dimensions that 
warrant complementary analysis. We hope that readers will use these essays as a source of 
inspiration to generate new questions. We cannot anticipate how those questions will be 
answered but we can imagine that the answers will operate across traditional academic 
disciplines. 
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